In a curious way, to focus upon the disobedient and the process of disobedience is to accept the perspective of the established order. It is a concession that it is the [wo]man who appeals beyond law that is in need of explanation.
Robert Cover, Justice Accused
Sophocles's Antigone is most often read as the story of an admirable civil disobedient (Antigone) who represents democratic or dissident princi ple by heroically resisting the overreaching sovereign power of her author itarian uncle (Creon). Antigone buries her brother, although it is prohibited, and is sentenced to death for her dissidence.1 This dissident Antigone is the object of Judith Butler's admiration in her quest for resources with which These political stakes of Antigone's actions are obscured by those who see in Antigone a model of dissident politics as heroic action untethered, as such, to any meaningful form of life. Such theorists are often drawn to the extraordinary and to a model of politics as rupture, and so may underrate the extent to which the dissident's "no" emanates not just from a rift in the current order or from a value at odds with the public and its law-divine law, the family, or the private-but also from her embeddedness in a form of life to which she says "yes" and on behalf of which her "no" is proclaimed.7 One such theorist, Slavoj Zizek, focuses on Antigone's "no!" and on her stam mering repetition of the tautology of her brother's kinship location in her (in)famous speech, which I discuss below. Zizek follows Lacan who points out that Antigone's love for Polynices has nothing to do with his traits, but is simply premised on his being her brother. He is who he is who he is for Antigone, Lacan says, and Zizek agrees. Butler brilliantly argues against
Lacan that Polynices's singularity is less tautological than might first appear because Antigone's references to her beloved brother are danger ously and productively doubled-her brother, son of her mother, is not only Polynices, as so many readers assume but also, of course, her father, Oedipus, who is also a son of Jocasta and whom (although Butler does not say this, Derrida does) Antigone also does not get to bury (AC, (60) (61) .8 Against Zizek, Butler too notes that Antigone does not "simply say 'no,"' although "negations riddle her speech" (AC, 68). Butler and I differ regard ing what it is that Antigone says yes to, however. To incest, to a different kin ship, to anomalous desire, as Butler suggests? Perhaps. Certainly there is much in the play that is illuminated by and that in turn licenses Butler's pow erful arguments against structuralist and psychoanalytic assumptions about kinship through the figure of the incestuous Antigone. But Antigone's identi fication with incest can figure something else too: The charge of incest is an old one leveled by democrats against aristocrats, those clannish families who are said to protect their power and privilege by marrying inward, blending the marital and natal family and bearing the less than optimal children that result from such endogamy. Of course, the charge is also made that aristocrats marry outward, acquiring through exogamy the wealth and soldiers they need to advance their power at home. Antigone shows her familiarity with such marital politics when she positions herself in her final speech between the two ill-fated marriages of her family, her father's endogamous incest, which destroyed him, and her brother's exogamous marriage to a daughter of the Argives, which enabled him to raise there an army to try to reclaim the Theban throne (864-71 [951-58] ).9
Creon's contemporary detractors will undoubtedly object to the charac terization of him as democratic, noting that he exhibits few of the standard democratic virtues and they would be right. But contemporary readers tend to think democracy is more a matter of procedure than substance. Reading procedurally, interpreters such as Martha Nussbaum see no evidence of democratic leaning in Creon, who after all does not deliberate nor consult with the people or the elders, and is hard pressed to take counsel from any one.'0 But Creon metonymizes democracy substantively. His ban on lamen tation and his repeated emphasis on the harms of individuality represent the fifth-century democratic view. That these are unaccompanied by other more positive traits also judged democratic in classical Athens is not evidence that Creon is not democratic; it may rather be evidence that the play casts democracy in a critical light."
Another reason for the misjudgment of Creon is commentators' assump tion that his kerygma against burying Polynices is obviously tyrannical or unjust. As Helene Foley points out, it was the specific measure of leaving the body out to rot that was the problem: "Contemporary Attic punishments of traitors involved casting the body outside the city's borders, throwing them below into pits and gorges, or casting them into the sea. Creon, on the other hand, left the body exposed and created pollution."'2 Even Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, one of very few to read Creon as democratic, accepts the view that his kerygma is at odds with her reading. She resolves the problem it seems to pose by suggesting that Creon's kerygma is an "error." He errs in leaving Polynices exposed rather than dishonoring the body in accordance with Attic norms for the treatment of traitors. On my reading, however, no such resolution is needed. Creon's excess is what marks him as democratic.
If Creon's treatment of Polynices exceeds the bounds of the permissible, that is perfectly compatible with the claim that Creon represents Attic norms which are here represented as are the Homeric hyperbolically, through the lens of the rival worldview with which they contend. From an elite/Homeric perspective, Creon does not depart from, he rather instances, democratic practice when he mistreats the dead and prohibits burial.
Moreover, insofar as democracy would appear tyrannical to a mid fifth-century Greek aristocrat, Creon's apparently tyrannical traits are fully compatible with his character as representative of democratic order.'3 Creon begins in statesmanlike voice (his first "ship of state" speech is Periclean).
If he becomes tyrannical over time, that may signal a defect of character; or it may suggest perspicacity: He sees that his struggle with Antigone is about more than a burial and a body. Within the framework of the play, their strug gle is about the terms of collective coexistence and the recalcitrance of a rival form of life. Creon may aim to clarify the terms of Theban membership when he promotes one brother as an honored son and denigrates the other as an enemy. One brother besieged the city ("he thirsted to drink his kinsmen's blood and sell the rest to slavery," says Creon of while the other sought to defend it (208 [233] ; cf. 285 [325] ) and so, as Antigone points out, Creon "graced one with all the rites and disgraced the other" (21-24 [26-27] ).'4 Eteocles is given an official honorific burial in which Antigone participates but Polynices is left out to rot. Creon may mean by these measures to consolidate the lines of Theban membership. But the issue of which brother's side Thebans should take is distinct from the larger question of whether and how a brother should be mourned; mourning prac tices postulate certain forms of collective life and so how we mourn is a deeply political issue to whose history in Athens I now briefly turn.
Regulating Lament
In the sixth century B.C.E., legislation is passed by Solon at Athens, then throughout Greece, restricting mourning and burial practices. Over 150 years before Sophocles wrote Antigone, Solon's polis-forming legislation called for restraining what Plutarch calls the "disorderly and unbridled quality" of women's grief [21.5] , as well as the "breast beating and lamen tation at burials." 15 What commentators today stress was "women's" mourning-loud, keening-was cast as "excessive." At the time, families burying their dead might have turned to threnon exarchoi, who sang the threnos, "a formal lament." These "professionals" "probably existed throughout antiquity despite possible efforts by Solon to abolish them by banning the singing of prepared dirges." 16 Kinswomen per formed goos (a personal and more improvised sort of dirge) which, when lamenting men killed in battle, focused on "the plight of the bereaved" and not on the "heroic feats" of the dead or their contribution to the public good.17 Both forms of lamentation featured calls for vengeance and both were subject to Solon's regulations, which were quite specific. The prothe sis "was to be held indoors and the ekphora could only take place in silence and before dawn."'8 The prothesis gave "the bereaved an opportunity to indulge in shameless self-pity by bemoaning the effects upon their own lives occasioned by the loss of the beloved." This practice is not so much an expression of authentic feeling as an orchestrated ritual.'9
There may be many reasons for Solon's innovations, including the need "in the newly formed democratic polis" to "diminish the power of the aristocracy" for whom funerals were a way to flaunt wealth.20 As Gail Holst-Warhaft points out, however, reining in the wealthy was not the only aim: (1) Solon set out to take charge of practices of remembrance in order to end cycles of vengeful violence that were seen as a threat to the new polis form (funerals were a locus of clan strife, especially in the case of a mur dered relative) and (2) the emerging city aimed to reorient mourning away from its focus on the lost, irreplaceable life and toward that life's honorable dedication to the good of the polis.21 These two aims are connected insofar as (1) the thirst for vengeance is whetted, not slaked, by the belief that dead relatives are (2) irreplaceable.
The aim seems to be to shift away from Homeric dirges' focus on the unique individuality of the dead, the loss to the surviving family caused by the death, and the call to vengeance.22 Homeric mourning features "extrav agant, out of control behaviour, including loud wailing, tearing the hair, and lacerating one's face. This is a common initial response to death, especially by men but also by women."23 Note that excess mourning, later attributed to women and cast as feminine from Solon to Pericles and beyond, is in fact a trait of both men's and women's mourning in Homer. At issue in the later ban, then, are formal practices of mourning (threnos) led by women (threnon exarchoi) and the practices of loud wailing and self-laceration (goos) previously conventional, now gendered feminine and cast as exces sive.24 Both focus on the family's loss rather than on the city's gain from the death being mourned.25
Given the privatization of the prothesis as well as its diminution (from nine days in Homer for Achilles to one day under Solon), we might expect to see forbidden practices of lamentation go underground, as it were, or take new forms. Indeed, it does seem possible that this is what happened when the late fifth century witnessed new developments in funerary prac tice. People (it may not have been women, specifically) began to place "in cemeteries, graves, pits or rivers the small folded lead plaques known as katadesmoi (curse-tablets)," most commonly in the graves of "those who died young or violently."26
Subtly or overtly the forbidden lamentations remained and retained traits the new polis form tried to erase.27 The laments aroused the passions of those left behind, highlighted the unique individuality of the lost life, and called for survivors to avenge the deceased. Solon in the early sixth century saw such practices as threatening to the new polis form. By the 440s, when Sophocles wrote Antigone, the threat had shifted but it was not diminished: Athens was now democratic and "the dead bodies mourned were more often than not the bodies of young men who died at war," no longer defending the polis but rather expanding the Athenian Empire.28
Prohibition was not the only strategy in fifth-century Athens. Eventually institutions of exception were established as well. One, what Larry J.
Bennett and William Blake Tyrrell call a "concession," allowed for the bones of the dead to be displayed for two days ("twice that allowed private funerals") in the agora and families could here mourn as they wished but on the third day the polis took over and the mourned became simply "the dead," nameless members of the city to be buried publicly.29 Also on offer were two new genres of loss-tragedy and the funeral oration.30 Funeral orations, delivered by men not women, glorified the dead for their contri bution to the city's greatness and also insisted on their replaceability. The epitaphios logos is the "polis' substitution of public praise for private mourning," Gail Horst-Warhaft says (124), though it might be more apt to say the epitaph substitutes one kind of public mourning-that of the clas sical city-for another kind of public mourning-Homeric. The Homeric mourner's focus on the hero's beautiful body, embodied pain, and bereave ment is replaced by the classical city's focus on gorgeous speech-oratory that moves and pleases its audience without calling for vengeance.3" With this substitution is launched a new economy of substitution, in which no one is said to possess such unique singularity that his loss should be seen as devastating to family or city. In this moment, we might say, Athens treats every soldier as an "unknown soldier." The patrios nomos, paternal ances tral law, set out rules for the public commemoration of Athenian war dead who were collected from the battlefields, divided up into their tribes (a social ordering established by Cleisthenes in 508) and cremated. Their ashes were put into common tribal coffins and displayed in the city. The names of the dead were listed on marble tablets. A big public oration was given in the public graveyard and, as Josiah Ober put it, then "everyone goes home til next year."
Tragedy, the genre of devastating loss, also became important, perhaps to compensate for the loss of loss (mourning practices), as it were, or to bal ance with its larger-than-life characterizations the smaller-than-life lot to which Athenian combatants were now consigned. But tragedy could also go too far. The first tragedy, now lost, The Capture of Miletus, authored by a little-known tragedian named Phrynichus triggered "an epidemic of uncon trollable grief' for Athens's sacrifice of Miletus to the Persians. For this, Phrynicus was fined a thousand drachmas and the performance of the play was prohibited by law. This puts some pressure on the common notion that Athenians shed tears at the theater that they were not allowed to shed elsewhere.32
The episode suggests tragedy was not only subversive of polis norms, as
Simon Goldhill and many others suggest. This institution of exception was also a regulated, disciplined domain within which some subversion was tol erated. Permitted, approved, if still also transgressive tragedy was a rela tively safe venue that allowed and even occasioned emotions like, but not the same as, the emotions once solicited by female mourners, some of whom were "professionals" not unlike the actors who performed in the dra mas. In tragic theater, emotions once exercised in now forbidden mourning rites are transformed into something else and exercised in moderation in a polis-centered and policed form. Thus, while the audience was watching Sophocles's Antigone and perhaps even feeling the justice of Antigone's cause, they were participating as spectators in one of the institutional forms that sought to mark her defeat and to enable the victory that I shall now argue her antagonist, Creon, hyperbolically sought.33
Antigone's Laments:
Homeric Mourning in Democratic Athens
With these contextual details in mind, readers may find Sophocles's Antigone opens up to them in new ways. Again and again, the play stages encounters between Homeric and classical mourning practices cast as excessive or well-judged. The distinction between these two kinds of mourning and their (im)propriety is just one way the play marks a larger divide between two paradigms of political culture: aristocratic Homeric individuality (and the community it postulates) and classical democratic community (and the forms of individuality it permits). Other markers in the play point to shifts in citizenship legislation (in 451/0, from aristocratic patrilineal to democratic bi-parental); changes in the mechanism for dis tributing civic responsibilities, from an aristocratic principle of worth to a democratic practice of randomness by lottery; and, more generally, a shift from an aristocratic ethics and politics of individuality and distinction to a democratic ethics and politics of interchangeability.34
That Antigone buries Polynices not once but twice in the play, that is, to the point of excess, is just one piece of evidence suggesting the play may explore historic tensions between Homeric and classical paradigms, one feature of which is the casting by the latter of the former's mourning prac tices as "excessive."35 There is more. When Antigone complains to Ismene that their brother Polynices, is "to be left unwept, unburied, a lovely trea sure for birds that scan the field and feast to their hearts ' content" (28-30 [35-36] ), Antigone re-cites the plight of Patroclus in the Iliad: "unwept, unburied."36 Also, Antigone's two recorded mourning speeches-one for Polynices (at the second burial) and one for herself are both clearly marked as Homeric, the first conventionally so, the other hyperbolically.37 We hear about the first of these two laments from the sentry who witnessed it. He describes Antigone in terms that call up all the forbidden elements of women's lamentation:
And she cried out a sharp piercing cry, like a bird come back to an empty nest, [in Homer, an iconic representation of the mother in mourning,] peer ing into its bed and all the babies gone [bereavement]. . . . Just so, when she sees the corpse bare she bursts into a long, shattering wail [loud, keening] and calls down withering curses on the heads of all who did the work [vengeance] . (424-28 [471-77] 
Later, as Antigone approaches the cave to which Creon has consigned her, she mourns again, this time for herself. When she describes her "future life immured in the cave as 'bereft"'39 and goes on to wail that she will never marry or have children, she is, in Nicole Loraux's words (said in the con text of an argument about Euripides' play), "like a Homeric mourner [who] weeps in advance over her future life."40 Antigone is not a professional mourner, she is not engaged in the more formal laments (threnos) first out lawed by Solon. Goos is the term used by Sophocles to describe Antigone's plaint. She does call for vengeance as she is led to the cave in which she will die, though the call is muted by comparison with her earlier lament for Polynices (she may doubt the justice of her cause now the gods seem to side with Creon): "Very well: if this is the pleasure of the gods, once I suffer I will know I was wrong. But if these men are wrong, let them suffer noth ing worse than they mete out to me-these masters of injustice" (925-28 [1017-21] ).
Here, also like a Homeric mourner, Antigone focuses on the unique, irre placeable lost life of Polynices. This seems to mark a shift from her earlier account of herself. Antigone is normally thought of as speaking on behalf of the gods of the underworld when she argues that the dead are all radi cally equal and, regardless of their deeds in the human world, must be buried. She does cite the gods. But her sentiments about the equality of the living and their equal claims to honor in death are also iconically Homeric:
As Simone Weil points out (in James Boyd White's parsing), there is an "'extraordinary sense of equity' in the Iliad. Homer describes Achaean and Trojan deaths . . . in identical terms, expressive of identical feelings." He so well recognizes "the equal humanity of the people who must suffer on both sides" that "'One is barely aware that the poet is a Greek and not a Trojan."' White adds, "A death is a death. Trojan or Achaean." This is Antigone's view. On it is premised her refusal to differentiate as the demo cratic Creon wants her to between Eteocles and Polynices.4" Antigone's earlier refusal to take seriously the friend-enemy distinction shifts to a focus in her final dirge on her brother's unique individuality. She ends by claiming a particular devotion to her brother, Polynices, to whom This argument is rejected by Goethe as "ganz schlecht" and it is charac terized by Kitto as a "frigid sophism."44 Many critics note that this speech, which seems calculating, renders Antigone unsympathetic and seems out of character for this otherwise principled, uncalculating woman.45 Some (called the "the cut-and-paste scholars" by Gellrich)46 say the passage is inauthentic, surely a later addition given its resemblance to a story told by Herodotus in his later Histories (3.119), in which Intaphrenes's wife, who is forced by Darius to choose among husband, children, and brother lest they all be put to death, chose to save the last because he alone was, she said, irreplaceable.47 Others insist Antigone's speech is original. Aristotle refers to it not many years later, the stories Herodotus compiled in his Histories were in wide circulation, and Sophocles and Herodotus were friends. Thus Antigone's use of the same reasoning may refer to the story retold by Herodotus yet still predate his writing. Most critics now treat the passage as authentic but the historical debate about its authenticity obscures a third interpretative option, another possible reference until now over looked and touched by a certain black humor.
In Pericles's Funeral Oration, delivered after Sophocles wrote Antigone but surely capturing themes current in the discursive context 11 years ear lier when Pericles was strategos in Athens, Pericles urges parents if they are still of childbearing age not to mourn too long over their lost sons but to have more children to replace them: "Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them for get their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general dan ger."48 As Loraux points out, the proviso about passing childbearing age is relevant to mothers not fathers, and so Pericles seems to have mothers in mind. But he never mentions mothers, only parents, in the Funeral Oration and when he turns immediately from the implied comfort of more children to their usefulness in securing good deliberation, he addresses only male citizens for only they deliberate. In this way, Loraux suggests, Pericles ends up erasing the figure his Oration means only to replace, the mother in mourning (referenced by the iconic bird at the empty nest to which the sen try compares Antigone).49
This erasure serves the needs of an economy of substitution ascendant in democratic Athens. When Antigone insists on the specific irreplaceability of the lost brother, she may be opposing a more general fifth-century Athenian claim that individual lives are replaceable, that past lives may be forgotten if future ones take their place. (This adds extra pathos to her final regret that she will not bear children; if she cannot it may be because she cannot bear children in a regime that treats them as the replacements it demands.) When Antigone says coldly that a husband or a child can be replaced, she calls attention to the coldness she combats. (It may be that Herodotus in reporting the story of Intaphrenes's wife meant to do the same thing.) When Antigone underlines Polynices's irreplaceability (the parents who bore him are dead) and grounds upon it her loyalty to him, she puts the lie to the idea that his death (but maybe also any death) can be responded to by way of an economy of substitution such as that called for by Pericles in the Oration.50 When she points out that Polynices is irreplaceable because his parents are dead, here too she may parody Pericles: Being dead means they are beyond the slim consolations of the Oration; they are, as it were, way too old to have more children. Haemon's suicide shows Ismene was right; he will not accept a replacement for Antigone. Antigone for her part may be saying in effect that there are other fields for her plow as well when she chooses her brother (natal fam ily, burial) over Haemon (marital family, marriage) and argues that she did so because her brother is uniquely irreplaceable unlike a husband or children who can be replaced. She may arrogate to herself rights and priv ileges that Creon seeks to reserve for his son, and maybe for all sons. (That is, this may be one place where Antigone re-cites, as Butler says she does, Creon's sovereign discourse.) Thus, the argument for an economy of sub stitution is made more than once, but each time it fails. Perhaps Sophocles in re-citing the story of Intaphrenes's wife used hyperbole here, as else where, to provoke his audience to question the economy of substitution or interchangeability which one critic identifies with democracy as such.52
Economies of Citizenship
The regulation of laments is part of an education into a new economy of citizenship whose centrality to the play is signaled subtly by the play's much noted but little analyzed reference to Antigone's re-citation of the story of Intaphrenes's wife. Critics commenting on Antigone's citation usually retell in brief schematic terms the story told by Herodotus, much as I have done. But there is more to it than that. The story of Intaphrenes's wife tells not just of a woman who reasoned similarly to Antigone but of a lamenting woman also confronted by the sovereign project of education to reason. In Herodotus's story, a woman laments outside Darius's palace. Her husband, Intaphrenes, and all his male family have been sentenced to death because Darius suspects Intaphrenes of plotting against him. Intaphrenes's wife "came to the palace and began to weep and lament outside the door, and continued so long to do so that Darius, moved to pity by her incessant tears, sent someone out to speak to her." "'Lady,' the message ran, 'the king is willing to spare the life of one member of your family-choose which of the prisoners you wish to save."53 The woman thinks over the offer and then informs the messenger that if she could only have one family member, she would choose her brother. "The answer," Herodotus reports, "amazed Darius, and he sent again and asked why it was that she rejected her husband and children and preferred to save her brother, who was neither so near to her as her children nor so dear to her as her husband." The woman now responds with the argument that earned her the admiration of the king and the puzzlement of readers through the ages: "'My lord,' she replied, Intaphrenes's wife does pick one. In picking one, she stops keening.
Darius continues her socialization from lamentation into logos when he goes on to demand that she give reasons for her choice, a request that pro duces the argument about the brother's irreplaceability. Critics argue end lessly about the meaning of this speech but the real point of interest is not what the woman says to Darius's messenger, but what she does when she says it: She gives reasons, she calculates, she ranks, she shows she has entered into an economy of exchange. She no longer laments and keens, she does not call for vengeance. Darius moves Intaphrenes's wife from the abyss of need, desire and loss into what Jacques Lacan calls "the service of the goods," an economy of calculation and satisfaction that Lacan rightly identifies with Creon.54
Where Darius succeeds, Creon fails. Creon says he wants to teach Antigone to reason properly, to know her place, taming her by blows, using force in the way that animals are tamed. But she does not respond to his methods. When Antigone cites this story, might she not do it hoping we will see her story too is about a sovereign's effort to move his subjects from the infinitude of loss into a finite and more governable economy of wants and their satisfactions?
If this is her intent, she misleads, for the analogy is not quite apt. Casting lots could be read as a sign of the soldiers' cowardice and avoid ance of duty and they do indeed "stare at the ground" and hang their "heads in fear," according to the sentry (270-71 [305-6] ). But it can also be seen as the opposite. In fifth-century Athens, almost all officials were chosen by lot, a practice first introduced more limitedly by Solon in the sixth century B.C.E. (Solon introduced appeals and some use of lottery; cit izen courts came later). Indeed, the men judging the plays performed at the Dionysian Festival had themselves been chosen by lot. Submitting to lot therefore need not be seen as an avoidance of responsibility, but as a con ventional mechanism for its distribution.57 More subtly, there may here be a careful critique of fifth-century democratic Athens, a quiet suggestion that this conventional mechanism of responsibility distribution is for cowards or makes cowards of those who rely on it.
A critique of the second quintessentially democratic institution, payment to the poor for public service, is also voiced. When Creon rashly accuses one after another of taking bribes and betraying the public good (as he sees it), he airs a familiar critique of the democratic practice: once paymentfor public service is rendered, the door is opened to prize payment over public service and suspicion of corruption is rife.58 Sophocles's genius may have been to find a way to broach such criticisms in front of an audience vul nerable to them and yet gamer from them prizes for it, too. Most important for us, however, these references to two of the democracy's institutions may be the play's way of alerting us to the fact that other democratic innovations are at issue in this drama-the regulation of mourning and the democratic reshaping of citizenship.
That Creon might represent the democracy is one plausible interpreta tion of the Chorus' welcome of him as "the new man for a new day" (157 (883-84 [970-71] ). This is not just "scornful," as Charles Segal says, though it is that too. More sig nificantly, Creon here sums up the classical view of Homeric mourning: It is excessive and self-centered. Those who go on and on when mourning others may as well be mourning themselves; it is all about them. They put the good of the city second to their own bereavement. The play represents this point of view hyperbolically: Creon airs the charge that Homeric mourning is self-indulgent-endless, excessive, and without regard for the good of the city-in response to one whose mourning is literally self-indulgent;
Antigone here actually does sing her own dirge.6" What is to be done with the endless dirge(r)? "Take her away, quickly!"
Homeric lamentation is to be "wall[ed] up," says Creon, who wants Antigone entombed in a cave where "dead or alive, she will be stripped of her rights, her stranger's rights" and her rites, for there she will stay, unwept, unmourned (885-90 [969-71] Antigone's laments regarding the life she has foregone, her losses, her singular attachment to her irreplaceable brother, the downfall of her family, and her calls for vengeance contrast sharply with Creon's regulation of funerary practice and his focus on the (dis)service of those now dead to the city. The two in contrast may suggest that if the democratic oration moves us too quickly out of mourning and does too little for the dead because it instrumentalizes them for its own ends, Homeric laments fail by contrast to move mourners along quickly enough. It allows them to wallow in endless dirges, encourages a kind of death identification, and fails to return sur vivors to life.65
These are the two poles in contention. But there are other options as well. Antigone is not alone in her lamentations. Concerns about the desta bilizing powers of lamentation are expressly raised, for example, when Eurydice, Creon's wife, hears of her son's suicide. Thus, the play's focus is not "how to solve the problem of Antigone," as Butler's and most other readings assume (though they might not share in the quest for "solution"), for the problem is not confined to Antigone.
Eurydice reacts strangely to a messenger's report that her son, Haemon, is dead of a suicide committed in his father's presence. The text says sim ply, "Eurydice turns and goes into the royal house." Her strange silence stands out by contrast with Antigone's wailing and calls for remark. Sure enough the Chorus asks, "What do you make of that? The lady's gone, without a word, good or bad" (1244-45 [1373-74] ). The messenger joins in their concern: "I'm alarmed, too," he says. He worries, however, not about Eurydice's well-being but about the well-being of the city: "But here's my hope-faced with her son's death she finds it unbecoming to mourn in public. Inside, under her roof, she'll set her women to the task and wail the sorrow of the house. She's too discreet. She won't do something rash" (1246-50 [1375-80] ). The stakes are clear: will Eurydice indulge in forbid den public, loud Homeric wailing or confine herself to the private, less "unbecoming" household-centered grief that good polis judgment since Solon recommends? (In the Gibbbons and Segal translation, the line reads, "She's not without good judgment and won't do wrong.") The messenger is confident; the chorus is not: "I'm not so sure. To me at least, a long heavy silence promises danger, just as much as a lot of empty outcries" (1251-52 [1381-83] ). The chorus calls the "empty outcries" potentially dangerous while also calling them empty and thereby simultaneously suggests the opposite. They are empty insofar as they cannot bring the dead back. But they are not at all empty insofar as they can restart a cycle of vengeance and destabilize the city. Loud lament can make citizens not only admire those who gave sons to the city but also, even at the same time, wonder at the wis dom of sacrificing the city's sons to war and question the economy of sub stitution that anchors these sacrifices.
In her private household, off the streets forbidden to her, Eurydice did not mourn quietly with her servants, as the messenger hoped (the chorus member's worry that "a long heavy silence promises danger" was perspic uous), nor did she call loudly and publicly for someone to avenge her son's death, as the messenger feared. The messenger reports to Creon that, inside, she raised "a cry for the noble fate of Megareus, the hero killed in the first assault, then for Haemon, then with her dying breath she called down tor ments on your head-you killed her sons" (1302-5 [1427-31] ). Rather than bear more children to replace those she lost, Eurydice ends her life cursing the husband she blames for her pain. Even in her death, "the dead, the woman lying there, piles the guilt of all their deaths on you," says the mes senger to Creon (1312 Creon ( -13 [1436 Another aristocratic complaint, that the classical city lacks the power to truly enforce its agenda, lurks in the fact noted by Tiresias that the body exiled outside the city by Creon keeps returning to the city in spite of his decree. If Polynices deserves as a traitor to be cast out of the city, Creon's kerygma has not secured that just desert but has on the contrary undone it precisely by leaving the body exposed. As a result, the exiled body keeps returning to the city in bits and pieces as carrion. On the reading developed here, however, Creon is no Achilles. Creon may be moved by rage against Polynices but if so then Creon evidences the dependence of the democratic view he mostly represents on elements of a Homeric ethos that the democracy both admires and abjures.80
Thus, the play troubles the binary of Homeric versus democratic in which it also traffics and whose contention it restages. But beyond these contiguities and slippages, the binary is finally and most importantly trou bled in the interruption of both the codes in contention here by a keening grief that stands out for its violation of all the expectations the play and its contexts have set in place.
Creon's Grief
If Creon is finally harshly undone, that may not be to show the depth of his offenses (on this account, they may not be as deep as some readers If Charles Segal and other (post-)structuralist readers of the play miss both the concessive and ruptural properties of Creon's grief, that is because they work within and against a binary framework in which it is Antigone who is positioned as ruptural-she is wild nature-by contrast with Creon, who represents the order of civilization without concession. These readers take their bearings from the structuralist opposition of the raw and the cooked but also from the chorus's characterization of Antigone as wild and passionate and from Creon's view of Antigone as needing taming. In this as in so much else, however, Creon and the Chorus may mislead. They express the democratic perspective which refuses to see Antigone as a metonymic marker of a rival worldview and casts her instead as outside order alto gether. This is hegemony's tactic-to act as if it has no rivals in the human world. Some of Antigone's contemporary admirers fall for it when they cast her as a metaphor for dissidence as such.86
Meanwhile, historicists too miss the significance of Creon's grief.
Bennett and Tyrrell because they assume Antigone not Creon represents the democratic view, and so overlook the possibly concessive trait, iconically democratic, of Creon's grief. Also, for them as for other historicists, there is no apparent historical referent in the historical context for an aneconomic grief that ruptures the historical practices evidenced by the material culture they study.
The concessive and ruptural readings of Creon's grief, it is worth noting, do not force upon us a choice. The concession to private lament opens to view a rupture that threatens to exceed temporal and spatial boundaries to which the polis seeks to confine it. That is, the Athenian "concession" to familial grief restages that recurring issue: the capacity of institutions of exception-tragedy (Goldhill), ritual (Seaford), and now concession (Bennett and Tyrrell)-to manage fires of disruption or loss without also fanning their flames. Focusing on the play's performance of grief highlights the concern that exception institutions like these cannot turn to totally con structive purposes the very forces and emotions those institutions seek to contain, manage, elicit. What if these forces and emotions, like the children of Oedipus, will not be kept out nor in?
We might be alerted to the ambiguity of the line delineating the inter pretative choice between concession and rupture by the fact that the play ends with Creon grieving but with the two bodies of his family members yet unburied. Who will bury them? Leaving the question open, the play exceeds the boundaries of its performance and interpellates the audience into this task. The central problem depicted in the play is in the end uncon tained by it, and this violates the mission of tragedy as an exception insti tution that stages or occasions but also contains prohibited forces and emotions. We do not know whether Haemon and Eurydice will be buried, nor by whom, nor how (in what manner). The responsibility is, in a way, left to us. Will we take it up as polis members, rendering the dead anony mous? Or will we memorialize them by name and assert their singularity?
How will we work through the infinite ruptural grief visited upon us by the play? The fifth-century audience faced these questions with some aware ness of Phrynicus whose unhappy fate constitutes the limit of too much grief and the promise of the festival's dance and ritual whose happy events constitute the limit of too little.
Earlier in the play, Creon accused Haemon of taking the woman's side (Antigone's) in the conflict. Haemon responded to his father: "If you are a woman, yes-my concern is all for you" (741 ). That reassurance, with its poisoned implication that Creon was something other than manly, is now realized as Creon is unmanned, deprived of his family and power.
Creon is led away: "Take me away," he says to his attendants, "quickly, out of sight, I don't even exist-I'm no one. Nothing" (1322-25 [1445-46] That Antigone is deprived of lamentation rites for both her father/brother and her brother calls to attention another pair of details: Oedipus's body mysteriously disappears (in Sophocles's Oedipus at Colonus) while that of Polynices refuses to disappear and repeatedly turns up as carrion in the city. Both circumstances make proper lament impossible.
9. Citations to the play indicate first the Greek lines and then, in the square brackets, the lines from the Fagles translation, which, unless otherwise noted, is the one used throughout. Creon as tyrant nor need we say that the audience was divided between these two options, as most classicists do.
14. Creon's focus is on Polynices's treason, as Rush Rehm points out, but Polynices con founds the effort to binarize: he is "both philos to Antigone and echthros to Thebes. Elsewhere, Creon is sensitive to the flux of status and identity, more so than Antigone who argues for Polynices's burial by reference to his status: "it was ... not some slave that died" (518 [581] ). Her point is challenged avant la lettre, when Creon subtly points to the flux of the identity "slave" saying of Polynices "he thirsted to drink his kinsmen's blood and sell the rest to slavery." Those who are free citizens one day may be slaves the next, if their city is con Beck, 1926) , the regulation of excess in funerary practice may cut both ways, as far as democracy is concerned: limiting "the amount which goes into a tomb increases the amount which can be inherited by the heirs." Garland, The Greek Way of Death, xxii. Aubrey Cannon suggests another counterintuitive explanation, parsed by Foley, Female Acts, 23n8: rather than democratize, rules against ostentatious funerals may have guarded a class distinction under pressure, protecting "symbolic distinctions in death rituals" from being blurred by lower class imitations of the wealthy.
21. cf. Foley, Female Acts, 23n8, 27; and Loraux, Mothers in Mourning.
22. The shift is noted by Holst-Warhaft, most pointedly, but tracked as well by Foley and Taxidou. Vernant explicates the Homeric episteme in detail but attends less to the shift.
Testifying to the contestedness of this shift over a century or more, Plato in the Republic has Socrates argue for the erasure from Homer of all the passages that describe death or the dead in ways that arouse emotions: "We shall ask Homer and the rest of the poets not to be too angry with us if we strike out these passages and any others like them. Not that they lack poetic merit, or that they don't give pleasure to most people. They do. But the more merit they have, the less suitable they are for boys and men who are expected to be free and fear slavery more 24. Perhaps they had become such; but apart from empirics, the point is they were expe rienced as excessive. 26. Some had in them names to be cursed: "In certain cases as many as ten or fifteen per sons are cursed on a single tablet. Other tablets are more explicit, containing formulae which curse the tongue, the eyes, the mouth, the psyche, the sanity, the arms and the legs of the named person, and invoke the assistance of the underworld deities, Persephone and Hermes."
The same may be true of another innovation, a "form of cursing [that] set a small lead figure with bound hands inside a lead coffin with an inscription on the inside lid." Plato refers to the practice at 364c in the Republic, as Garland points out. "Often the reason for cursing appears to have been a lawcourt testimony," says Garland, The Greek Way of Death, 6-7. The katadesmoi may have been an iteration of the earlier, now-forbidden, revenge-seeking laments.
27. But not just women's lamentations: "Male lament in Homer does not carry the con notations of femininity and theatricality that are attached to it after Solon's laws are imple mented." Taxidou, Tragedy, Modernity, and Mourning, 176. Still, there may have been gendered differences in mourning: "The two main gestures of mourning on Geometric vases
[were] the female attitude of holding both hands to the head and tearing the hair, and the male attitude of holding one hand to the head, apparently beating it but not actually tearing the hair."
Garland, The Greek Way of Death, 29.
28. Taxidou, Tragedy, Modernity, and Mourning, 30. Also at issue, speculate some com mentators, was a power struggle among women's clans, the aristocracy, Solon, and the new polis form. On this, see Foley, Female Acts, [23] [24] [25] Dangerous Voices, . Two centuries later, Plato identified women with loud mourning, while acknowledging that men so weep too. In Plato's Phaedo (117d) when Socrates drinks the poison, the men who surround him begin to weep but he quickly calls them to order: "What is this strange outcry?" asks Socrates, "I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not offend in this way." actually not performed by Antigone but rather, as the elders worriedly suggest, by the gods.
Segal, Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 160. This possibility opens the play up, as I argue elsewhere, and explains why Antigone will not disavow the deed nor own up to it, a point made much of by Butler. This may seem to argue against my point that Antigone in burying Polynices twice buries to excess, but it is surely excessive to rebury a second time, regardless of whose agency is responsible for the first burial. For Creon, in any case, the second burial is "excessive" since it indulges in the forbidden laments. For a different reading of the first burial, see my Antigone, Interrupted, chap. 4.
38. Not quite all the forbidden elements of lament are in play here. Antigone does not self-lacerate. This may suggest she is less excessive than Creon (excessively) thinks. And/or it may suggest she is already domesticated by the polis' substitution of logos for embodiment. If she does not self-lacerate, does that mean her grief is somehow articulable and does not require the fleshly expression common in Homer?
Notably, since the sentry describes what he heard, the report is witness testimony and therefore suspect. Sophocles could have had Antigone perform the goos on stage; she is said to have done it openly, with the sun high in the sky. , 125-29, 134-37 . This is a very interesting take, but it recuperates for a binary framework what I see as an illustration of a plural spectrum of possibilities in lament (Segal puts Antigone and Eurydice together, though Antigone does not "self-harm" in lament) and it goes against Loraux's mapping of the gendered pattern of suicide. Ibid., 135. Something Segal does not attend to: in the Homeric paradigm, women and men mourn similarly. But Segal refers repeatedly, as do most commentators in the past 15 or more years, to "women's lamentation." 69. Taxidou, Modernity and Mourning, 178.
70. Gellrich, Tragedy and Theory, 72.
71. Foley criticizes "unilateral and anti-dialogic" readings and calls for approaches that attend to plural voices in drama rather than "privilege one voice over another" as the carrier of a play's meaning. Ancient Greek tragedy confronts us "not only with a cultural system that prides itself on being open to public exchanges of ideas and differences of opinion but also with a literary form such as drama, which unfolds as a complex dialogue that refuses to be bound in any direct fashion by the discourses of the agora." Foley, "Tragedy and Democratic , from which the democratic polis may persistently benefit." The political undesirability of a powerful family's "introverted autonomy" is enacted, and the play also interpellates the audi ence into an "emotional cohesion of collective pity for those destroyed." Seaford, "Historicizing Tragic Ambivalence," 207. Thus, polis unity is twice achieved: powerful threats are eliminated and shared pity for them elicited.
73. Ibid., 207.
74. Foley, "Tragedy and Democratic Ideology," 144. 75. Thus, I differ from Roselli's conclusion that "Antigone may question some of the fault lines of Athenian society, but it also affirms an archaic and elitist practice of celebrating the elite citizen male, as archaic elites had done and as a few Athenian families continued to do."
Roselli, "Polyneices' Body," 158. The practice is referenced in the play but is also presented in politicizing and parodie terms. But the text suggests another reading as well: As I suggest above, it is also true that Creon's fail ure to undo his deeds is partly due to his failure to listen to the Chorus' leader. Going to Polynices first and to Antigone only second, Creon chooses not only to try (and fail) to undo his deed, as Markell suggests, but also or instead to permit the deed to continue to outrace his efforts to undo it?Antigone dies in the time it takes Creon to get there, having stopped first to bury Polynices. There may be more agency here and more power than Markell notes, both in Creon's choices and in Antigone's. Indeed, that is what tragedy may be said to require, a sense that until the last possible moment it could have been otherwise, and even then. . . .
Moreover,
there is agency here beyond that of the primary players. The messengers, sentry, soldiers animate the action by reporting the goings-on to the various players, even though the reactions to what is heard are predictably tragic (lament, suicide). There is something of an Upstairs-Downstairs class politics at work here. 
